Semiconductors for Europe: geopolitical risk turns structural

After the 2020-2022 supply crisis, Europe realized semiconductors are a security issue, not just an industrial policy one. The EU Semiconductor Geopolitical Risk Survey: Outlook for 2026-2031, published in July 2026, measures how much work remains. Analysts Joris Teer (Euiss) and Pierre Sel (Institut Montaigne) conducted it under the Chips Diplomacy Support Initiative, interviewing 55 people from industry, research, government and think tanks.

The two threats at the top

Respondents ranked restricted access to essential manufacturing inputs as the top risk. A military conflict over Taiwan followed closely. The scenarios differ in nature but converge in effect: both strike at Europe's ability to manufacture, not just to buy. The authors conclude that European vulnerability has not been resolved, only made visible. They call for selective diplomatic alliances, monitoring capacity and regular stress tests, rejecting the illusion of autarky.

International investment trends confirm that production capacity is the stake. In South Korea, SK Hynix and Samsung plan a memory and semiconductor cluster in the Honam region. The park covers about 8.26 million square metres, with 2.08 million available immediately. Site preparation starts in 2027. Energy and water supplies should be complete by the end of 2028, and the first production batch comes online in June 2030. Samsung moved the first batch of the Yongin complex forward to October 2029. In the same weeks, Intel chief executive Lip-Bu Tan noted that Intel remains among TSMC's top ten customers. No one, he observed, can cover the entire supply chain alone.

What it means for Italian industry

For Italy's manufacturing system, the message is operational. Companies relying on long-cycle components, such as industrial automation, automotive, professional electronics and telecommunications, must treat semiconductor availability as a risk to manage. They need strategic stockpiles, dual suppliers and contract visibility. It is not a problem to solve when the order is placed.

There is also a European dimension. The survey suggests chip policy must include anticipatory tools: geopolitical risk observatories, joint exercises between companies and governments, and coordination with Asian and North American partners that goes beyond trade. Without this forecasting capacity, investments in new plants risk arriving when the scenario has already changed.

"Dependence cannot be eliminated: it is managed with alliances, transparency and continuous monitoring" is the report's central argument.